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While Abu Mazen believes that the main Palestinian effort must be directed towards the United States and the Israeli public and that the intifada must be stopped, Barghouti believe that the US will remain wedded to Israel and that the Israelis understand only the language of force. But both sides agree on the ultimate aim: a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Abu Mazen could cry out: "Give me some credit!"

Of course, his great predecessor cannot attack him except indirectly, by way of his legacy. But Abu Mazen has enough opponents in his own Fatah party.

Television presents this as a personal fight between him and the middle generation, in particular Marwan Barghouti. That lies in the nature of television. Since the small screen is at its best when it shows a human face, but is unable to show ideas, every controversy becomes a matter of personalities.

Naturally, the Abu Mazen-Barghouti controversy does partly reflect a personal and generational confrontation. Abu Mazen represents the Fatah old guard, while his opponents represent the fighters of the first and second intifada. But the real confrontation is between two world views and two grand strategies for the Palestinian national liberation struggle.

Abu Mazen strategy goes like this:

the main Palestinian effort must be directed towards the United States and the Israeli public. There is now an opportunity to change the one-sided policy of President Bush. During his second term of office he can ignore the powerful Jewish lobby, since he cannot be elected again anyhow.

Israeli public opinion, too, can be changed. For this, the armed intifada must be stopped. In Abu Mazen's view, it has brought no benefits to the Palestinians, but rather hurt their cause.

Barghouti and most of the young Fatah generation rejects this view out of hand.

They believe that it is based on illusions. Bush is under the influence of Sharon and, anyhow, he is one of the Christian fundamentalists who support the most extreme right-wing in Israel. Also, it makes no sense to rely on the Israeli Peace Camp, which has forsaken the Palestinians in their hour of dire need. Except for some small groups, they have done nothing to end the brutal occupation, the killing, the destruction and starving out, the choking separation wall and the expropriation of land and water. All it does is issue papers that have no effect whatsoever.

The young Fatah generation have hit the Israeli economy hard. They have created an atmosphere of fear and a reality of poverty. The Israelis understand only the language of force.

A more moderate variant of this attitude proposes intensifying attacks on settlers and soldiers, but stopping the attacks on civilians in Israel proper.

While Arafat was alive, the controversy did not get out of hand, because Arafat created a synthesis between the two approaches. He used - alternately or simultaneously - diplomacy and force, according to the changing situation. The adherents of both strategies saw him as their leader. And, indeed, Arafat led the strategy of recognizing Israel and seeking peace with it, as in Oslo. But when he came to the conclusion that this effort had run into an Israeli wall, he would let Marwan Barghouti do what is necessary.

Now Arafat is gone. The two strategies clash in the Palestinian society, and perhaps in every Palestinian home.

One thing must be clear: the debate about strategy does not reflect a divergence of aims. All Fatah factions are united around the aims laid down by Arafat: a Palestinian state, the pre-1967 borders (with some possible exchange of territories), East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, sovereignty over the "Temple Mount", evacuation of the settlements, an agreed solution to the refugee problem. There is no argument about these.

So how will the controversy be settled?

It will not be easy for the wearers of suits to overcome the bearers of Kalashnikovs, who put their lives on the line every day. But the Palestinians will use their intelligence. They may well ask themselves:

Abu Mazen wants credit? Let's give him credit. He believes that he can extract concessions from Bush and Sharon? Why not give him a chance?

Let him try to achieve an end to "targeted liquidations", "verification of killing", demolition of homes, degradation at the checkpoints. Let him try to get meaningful peace negotiations started. Let's see if Bush offers him more than empty phrases.

However, Marwan Barghouti's supporters may well ask say:

The first time, when the Americans pressured the Palestinians into appointing Abu Mazen prime minister, he got nothing. Sharon stuck a knife in his back. Bush ignored him. They will do that same thing again and again and he will achieve nothing. So, let the Kalashnikovs speak again.

That is the background of Marwan Barghouti's decision to run this time.

Having said all that, I doubt the elections will be fair one. I can see Abu Mazen already wining unfair/ready-made elections. But every credit expires sometime. Half a year? A year? Certainly no more. Abu Mazen has already promised Barghouti to hold elections inside Fatah within nine months.

If the credit bears no interest, the Third Intifada will surely follow.