By Ray Smith * | Sabbah Report | www.sabbah.biz

More than three years after Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in the north of Lebanon was destroyed, its reconstruction is finally under way. However, the process runs at a slow pace and remains only partially funded as further political obstacles appear on the horizon. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army continues to maintain a tight grip on the camp's residents and attempts to silence any criticism.

Anyone approaching the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp on the highway connecting the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli to the Syrian border can see it -- the first row of houses are four stories high. After three years of tough negotiations, countless obstacles and various delays, reconstruction is actually underway.

The master plan for the reconstruction of the camp was prepared in early 2008, only half a year after a 15-week battle between the Lebanese army and the non-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam that left the camp totally devastated. The camp's 30,000 residents were displaced, some for the third or fourth time since they were expelled from Palestine by Zionist militias in 1948 -- what Palestinians call the Nakba.

Delayed reconstruction

Reconstruction effectively kicked off in November 2009. "There were a number of problems getting the whole thing started, demining in the first place," said Charlie Higgins, Project Manager for the Reconstruction of Nahr al-Bared with the UN agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA). "When we started the backfilling there, the whole archaeological controversy and the related court injunction came up, effectively delaying the process for another five months," he explained, referring to a politically-motivated attempt by Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun in 2009 to stop reconstruction of the camp because of evidence of archaeological remains.

For practical reasons, the project was split into eight stages or "packages". The first stage -- consisting of 149 buildings which house 423 of more than 5,000 displaced families -- is approaching completion, however with significant delay. "We expect to be able to hand over a number of apartments probably in early 2011," Higgins said.

The main reasons for the delay are attributed to the construction company which subcontracted major parts of the work, adding additional layers of management that increased costs while reducing control of progress on site. Higgins said that without UNRWA's constant pressure and threats of penalties, less would have been done.

Most workers on the construction site are Syrians and Palestinians. One of them is "M," a resident of the Nahr al-Bared camp in his twenties. Almost three years ago, his family was permitted to return to the outskirts of the devastated camp. There, they've been living in steel containers, which residents call the "barracks," awaiting the reconstruction of their homes. "When we moved into the temporary housing, we didn't expect to be staying in there for such a long time," M said. "Living in the barracks has always been very difficult."

During the last years, unemployment, harsh living conditions, poverty, desperation and constant psychological stress have diminished M's initial hope for a quick return. Now, he's happy to have an income at least, although his job isn't safe. By working on the first stage, M is witnessing the slow pace of reconstruction. "I have no illusions," he admitted, "it will take a few more years until my family and I will be able to return home."

According to Higgins, UNRWA's efforts to get the contractor to employ Palestinians from the camp caused problems. "Workers need special permits to access the site, and to obtain them they may have to report to the headquarters of the Lebanese Armed Forces in al-Qubbe for investigation. This discourages some people from applying for jobs, and the contractor has cited the time taken as a factor beyond their control that delays the work."

Recently, backfilling work has started in parts of the area designated for stage two of the reconstruction. UNRWA anticipates its completion by autumn 2011. The agency is determined to avoid the delays it encountered in the first sector. In addition, three schools at UNRWA's coastal compound are under construction and will be ready by next summer.

One of the major obstacles on the way to rebuilding the camp is the lack of funding. "We have $120 million, but we still need another $209 million," said Higgins. Yet he remains optimistic that once the initial group of residents have moved into the first homes, donors will be encouraged to make further pledges. According to Higgins, "We'd have a strong case to say: we can prove it can be done. Now, what about the other 16,000 or 17,000 people we need to give back their homes?"

"The adjacent area"

Even more doubtful is the reconstruction of the immediate surroundings of the camp, which have been termed by UNRWA and the Lebanese government as the "adjacent area." The area forms a ring around the official boundaries of the camp and was inhabited by almost 10,000 Palestinian refugees. As the original camp became increasingly densely populated over time, houses grew in height and width, leaving hardly any place for streets and alleys. Consequently, many residents resettled in the camp's adjacent area.

Many homes in the surrounding area were either totally or partially destroyed in the war. The Vienna document of June 2008, outlining the Lebanese government's recovery and reconstruction strategy for the camp and the nearby municipalities, charged a Tripartite Committee consisting of the government itself, UNRWA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with the development of a full implementation plan for recovery and reconstruction in the adjacent area.

However, the committee was never formed. UNRWA denies having a role in the reconstruction of the adjacent area, limiting its responsibility to the camp's original site. Palestinian refugees living in the adjacent area are entitled to benefit from UNRWA's services as their registration with the agency is valid regardless of where they reside. UNRWA stresses its current infrastructure and efforts in the adjacent area have to be considered as temporary and within the agency's emergency response to the displacement of the residents.

Speaking on behalf of the PLO, Marwan Abdelal said bluntly: "In political terms, there's no partnership."

The Lebanese government has not taken part in any participatory mechanism, nor has it presented a plan for the adjacent area or undertaken any significant recovery efforts yet. However, it has compensated residents of the third-ring or outlying area of the camp for war-related losses.

Problems in the adjacent area have deep roots. Decades ago, zoning laws were violated when Lebanese private land plots were subdivided in order to sell them to Palestinians. This illegal practice is common to many Lebanese villages and poor neighborhoods. The Lebanese government and its appointed official responsible for the reconstruction of the camp, Sateh Arnaout, have made it clear that the zoning laws will be strictly followed. However, if the reconstruction in the adjacent area has to happen according to Lebanon's zoning laws, half of the existing buildings would actually have to be demolished.

In addition, approximately 90 percent of the refugees' land purchases before 2001 were never fully entered in the Lebanese land registry and remain listed under the name of the former Lebanese owners. Even worse, since 2001, Palestinians are forbidden to own or inherit property. Legal reconstruction and registration is therefore impossible.

"Palestinian residents in the adjacent area whose houses were totally destroyed are the first victims of this policy, as the government still blocks their reconstruction," said Abdelal. "At least we've successfully intervened concerning the rehabilitation of the partially demolished homes."

At a recent conference at the American University of Beirut, Rana Hassan, a Master of Urban Policy and Planning candidate at the university's Architecture and Design Department, stated that a different approach is needed by the Lebanese government. She cited precedents such as the reconstruction in south Lebanon's villages and Beirut's southern Dahiya suburb after the destructive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006. Nevertheless, the Lebanese government's Recovery and Reconstruction Cell (RRC) seems to stubbornly insist on strict adherence to zoning laws when it comes to Nahr al-Bared.

No freedom of movement

Three years after the end of hostilities in Nahr al-Bared, the refugee camp and the adjacent area remain a military zone. Checkpoints manned by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a rigid permit system and recently reenforced barbed wire restrict access to the camp. For years, residents have protested this access regime without success. UNRWA's Higgins said that the agency believes the return of the first residents will be a change on the ground that could lead to more positive developments on access in general.

However, Abdelal argued that "The war has ended three years ago, so there's no need for the army's presence anymore."

Nor has the army eased its entry restrictions in response to the construction. "We haven't seen any significant change on access over recent months," Higgins acknowledged. Although Lebanese citizens can enter without special permits, they're subjected to questioning at the checkpoints. The refugees' permits are valid longer than before, but visitors or nongovernmental organization personnel face even more difficulties to obtaining entry permits.

Within the camp, hardly anyone dares to speak up against the LAF. "Freedom of speech is massively restricted," said Ismael Sheikh Hassan, an architect and urban planner who has worked with the community-based Nahr al-Bared Reconstruction Commission for several years. "Anyone in Nahr al-Bared can be arrested by the military intelligence and be held without access to family, lawyers, etc.," he explained. He says there are many cases that were never publicized, partly due to the fact that hardly any journalists manage to obtain army permits to access the camps.

Sheikh Hassan is convinced that under military siege, the camp's economy will never be able to function. Its residents are now almost completely dependent on international assistance.

"More importantly," Hassan said, "under the army's restrictions, there is no chance for reestablishing relations between the camp and the surrounding communities to return to a level of normality."

Even if some restrictions were relaxed, Hassan stated, any prolongation of the militarization and siege of the camp might have irreversible consequences. "Economies and consumer patterns might shift and Nahr al-Bared might never be able to return to its previous economic role in the region," he said.

Silencing the critics

In mid-August, Sheikh Hassan was arrested at a checkpoint when entering Nahr al-Bared. He was held for three days. His interrogation revealed that he was apparently detained because of an article he wrote for the Lebanese newspaper as-Safir describing the conditions in Nahr al-Bared. After his release, it remains unclear whether he'll have to appear in front of a court.

"The situation is gray," Hassan explained. "There is no official court date. But also, there's no acquittal that I'm innocent."

Over the past few months, the LAF have been conducting a campaign of intimidation against its critics. Recently, the director of a nongovernmental organization operating in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp had his entry permit revoked after criticizing the LAF. Also, since July, the LAF refused to issue permits to the staff of another organization, the Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO).

Ghassan Abdallah, the PHRO's director, is an outspoken opponent of the LAF's permit regime and intimidation practices in Nahr al-Bared. The PHRO recently released a report examining restrictions on freedom of movement in the camp (Lebanese Restrictions on Freedom of Movement [PDF]). On 5 October, Abdallah was invited by Lebanese military intelligence to have a cup of coffee at the al-Qubbe army base. When he arrived at the base four days later, Abdallah was interrogated for three hours and even threatened with torture. In particular, Abdallah was questioned about a dialogue meeting on the LAF's access policy to Nahr al-Bared that he had co-organized.

"The security zone," Abdallah said, "is neither legal, nor humane. There's no excuse for it after three years." However, army intelligence doesn't accept this kind of criticism, he said. He expressed his outrage that after an official meeting where the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee and the LAF were represented, he was interrogated by military intelligence.

On 16 October, Lebanese activist and blogger Farah Kobeissi was arrested at the al-Abdi checkpoint at the northern entrance to Nahr al-Bared and interrogated for 14 hours after protesting against the army which denied her entry to the camp. During the protest, she held a banner stating: "No to the humiliating permits in Nahr al-Bared Camp."

The LAF maintains full authority over the camp, which it is not reluctant to display. Three months ago, it unveiled a monument dedicated to the fallen Lebanese soldiers of the Nahr al-Bared battle at the northern entrance to the camp.

Construction worker "M" is upset that the monument doesn't mention the fifty Palestinian civilians who were killed in the conflict. "This is the wrong place for this statue," he said. "They shouldn't have put it right in front of our camp."

Palestinians a "special category"

Nahr al-Bared isn't just a Palestinian refugee camp that was destroyed and has to be rebuilt. It showcases the difficult situation of the more than 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who have faced massive discrimination for more than sixty years.

At the American University of Beirut, associate professor Sari Hanafi closely observes Palestinian-Lebanese relations. He understands Lebanon's desire to have full control over its territory and inhabitants. "However," he said, "when you talk about sovereignty, you have to define who's subjected to it." For decades, Lebanon's Palestinians have been treated as a special category.

Hanafi stressed that Lebanon finally has to clarify the Palestinians' status, bear the consequences and abolish their discrimination. "If it considers them foreigners," he said, "they need to be given the possibility to work, own property and join the professional syndicates. If it considers them refugees, they have to be given all their refugee rights according to the 1951 Refugee Convention."

The debate on the Palestinians' legal situation is directly connected to the Nahr al-Bared camp, where the Lebanese police have established a center. According to the Vienna document, "community policing" is to be implemented in the camp. The project is funded with $5 million by the United States. On the ground however, the LAF and the military intelligence remain in charge. Many residents compare their rule to the former Deuxieme Bureau, the military intelligence service which had harsly controlled the Palestinian refugee camps the 1950s and '60s.

Hanafi considers the police deployment as highly problematic, as long as the inhabitants' status isn't clearly defined. "I see the police stationed in Nahr al-Bared as a counterinsurgency police, not a community police," he said. "There's no agreement with the local popular committee. On the contrary -- the first thing the police did was outlaw all the Palestinian structures there."

"In any case: If any Lebanese police in Nahr al-Bared were to implement the current discriminatory law, nearly anyone in the camp would have to be arrested -- for owning property, for working in forbidden professions, etc," Hanafi added.

Hanafi said Palestinians have legitimate reason to fear the police. "They are right in saying: 'Before you bring the police, let us know if we can have shops, associations and a popular committee.'"

Earlier this month, the UN Human Rights Council reviewed the human rights situation in Lebanon. Many member states accused Lebanon of discriminating against the Palestinian refugees. Their recommendations focused on freedom of movement, property rights and access to all professions -- which were rejected by the Lebanese government. Similarly, Norway's specific request to allow free entry into and exit from the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp was also rejected by the Lebanese delegation.

The Nahr al-Bared refugee camp highlights every aspect of the problematic relationship between Lebanon and the Palestinian refugees within its borders. However, the Lebanese government would be better served by viewing the camp as a chance to radically change the traditionally conflict-ridden relationship in which Palestinians are only viewed as a "security issue." This could be achieved by respecting Palestinians' civil rights and seriously engaging in the reconstruction of the camp.

All images by Ray Smith.

* Ray Smith is a freelance journalist and activist with the anarchist media collective a-films, which has documented developments in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp for the past three years.

The hip-hop beats ringing through the muddy, unlit streets of the burnt-out Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared seem incongruous. But the rhymes are camp-grown - and courageous.

"I'm carrying worries / From inside a destroyed camp / I'm preparing an attack / Words that keep turning in my head / Nahr al-Bared is fenced-in with iron bars / In the newspapers they speak about suffering / Every word makes sense."

Farhan Abu Siyam, 21, is Nahr al-Bared's first and only rapper. Going by the name of MC Tamarrod (which translates as MC Rebellion), he grew up in the Palestinian refugee camps of Nahr al-Bared and Bourj al-Barajneh.

Abu Siyam knows that hip-hop has few takers within Palestinian society. "Many people don't like rap because they're against Western music and its elements like the beat." But he asks the community to give rap a chance, stressing that he does not sing in a foreign language, but uses Arabic. "I rap in our Palestinian dialect, in the language of the camps where I was born and grew up."

Abu Siyam says he is inspired by the hip-hop crews 'Katibe 5' and 'I-Voice' in Beirut's Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camp and rap groups in Palestine such as 'Ramallah Underground' or 'DAM' which are regarded as the founders of Palestinian hip-hop and have a style that is serious rather than entertainment-oriented.

Palestinian rappers are usually inseparable from their origins, stress their marginalised or oppressed situation and use their words as weapons in their political and social struggles. Groups direct their rhymes at the discrimination that the approximately 250,000 Palestinians in Lebanon face as well as at their own society's establishment, accusing NGOs and the political parties of being corrupt and betraying the Palestinian cause.

Abu Siyam raps about the miserable post-war life in Nahr al-Bared. Together with the autonomous media collective 'a-films', he has produced a short video clip. Gesturing in front of a bullet-riddled wall in a burnt-out building, he revisits the camp's devastating war in 2007 and raps:

"Asking me what happened? / Those who hit have run / Those who passed by have looted / And some of them have burned."

Video link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9uCX6XeS3c

Two and a half years ago, the Nahr al-Bared camp in Lebanon's north was totally destroyed in a war between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the non-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam. Two-thirds of the camp's former inhabitants now live on its outskirts in damaged homes and temporary shacks. Abu Siyam says many people sing or talk about Nahr al-Bared, "but nobody speaks out about the war, the hopelessness and oppression."

Nahr al-Bared is still closed down and designated as a military zone by the LAF which mans five checkpoints around the camp. Access is restricted and journalists are not allowed to work freely. "We're surrounded and live like in a prison. In other camps people can come and go in a normal way," says Abu Siyam. The LAF's presence in and around Nahr al-Bared is one of the main topics Abu Siyam raps about:

"I'm Palestinian and don't submit to the rule of your army / Stop building this wall! / From the first time I saw you, I knew what you wanted / 'Hey you, give me your ID, where's the permit?'"

The Lebanese army states the checkpoints and permits are necessary to preserve the safety of the people "through preventing the infiltration of terrorists and wanted people, smuggling of weapons, explosives, and illegal material." However, many refugees in Nahr al-Bared feel humiliated and oppressed by the LAF. Abu Wissam Gharib, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Nahr al-Bared, says he understands that warfare required an army, "but once the war is over, why does the army stay?" Gharib wonders why he needs to have special permit to return home to Nahr al-Bared when he can travel everywhere else in Lebanon on his ID.

Abu Siyam records in al-Mukhayyamat studio in the Palestinian refugee camp of Bourj al-Barajneh, located in the suburbs of Beirut.

"The parties are two-faced / Their authority is silly / Fortified by lies / Their politics are sick."

Abu Siyam is aware of the power of his lyrics. "We're not against the Lebanese system, but they deprive us of our rights." Palestinian youth do not see a future in Lebanon and see emigration as a way out. When a delegation from donor states recently visited Nahr al-Bared, the residents of the temporary housing units did not ask them for more aid, but for visas allowing them to emigrate.

In Nahr al-Bared the slow reconstruction and the continued presence of the LAF have led to widespread unemployment. Charlie Higgins, project manager for Nahr al-Bared's reconstruction at the United Nations Works and Relief Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) describes the economic situation in the camp as "stuck," with the economy yet to regenerate and employment situation unimproved since the war ended.

Abu Siyam hopes that whenever Nahr al-Bared is rebuilt there will be a music studio where he might record his songs. He will have to drive to Beirut to record the two new rap numbers that he is currently working on.

Source: a-films

Two years after the outbreak of the war in Nahr Al-Bared, the camp's fate remains unclear. the reconstruction of the official camp might start soon, but the army keeps its tight grip on the camp. Several checkpoints, barbed wire and military posts cut Nahr Al-Bared off from its surroundings.

Nahr Al-Bared camp used to be a thriving marketplace in the northern Lebanese region of Akkar and about half its costumers were Lebanese. During the war, the Lebanese army has not only defeated the militant group Fatah Al-Islam, but also completely destroyed the refugee camp. Its businesses were looted, smashed and burnt, even after the war had ended. The camp's once flourishing economy was physically eliminated.

Two years later, about half the camp's population has returned to its adjacent area. Hundreds of businesses have re-opened, but economic recovery is seriously hampered by the tight siege imposed by the Lebanese army. Thus, suspicions have risen that the war's actual target wasn't Fatah Al-Islam, but Nahr Al-Bared's economic life.

In this 10-minute film, the co-owner of an ice cream factory, the president of the local trader's committee and the imam of the Al-Quds mosque speak out on the siege and its economic consequences.

Source: A-Films

In may 2007, the battle between Fatah Al-Islam and the Lebanese army broke out in Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. Amidst heavy fighting, the Lebanese army had systematically destroyed the entire camp by september 2007. Two years later, nearly all the rubble has been cleared from the "old camp", the core of Nahr Al-Bared. however, though the displaced residents grow increasingly desperate, reconstruction has yet to begin.

Not only does the Lebanese army keep people away from the old camp, but it also controls movement in and out of the surrounding area known as the "new camp." Anyone entering the new camp requires a valid permit issued by the army. Refugees and NGOs working to revitalize the once robust economy of the camp face crippling isolation, as the marketplace of Nahr Al-Bared is totally cut off from the surrounding villages. A flailing economy and soaring unemployment are only a few of the consequences of the destruction and ongoing siege of the camp.

This 26-minute film follows a father and his son as they attempt to deal with their unemployment. The two have been living in metal barracks for more than a year, waiting to return to their camp. By documenting issues of reconstruction, temporary housing, economy, unemployment and despair, the film touches on the daily experience of life in Nahr Al-Bared camp.

The film can be downloaded here (.mpeg/804mb) and here (.mov/313mb) in good quality. It can be watched here (part 1/2/3) on youtube or below.

Part 1:

Part 2:

Part 3:

Via: A-Films

I've been watching the latest Palestinian refugees crises for a week now. Thousands of Palestinian refugees fled from Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon as one week of clashes by the Lebanese army and a militant group known as Fath al-Islam has left dozens of soldiers and fighters (better described as terrorists) and an unknown number of civilians dead.

The situation of these Palestinian refugees worsens, 59 years after they were first expelled from their homeland into Lebanon. The world looks on in silence, while the U.S. RUSH with arms to support...?

There are many theories and version that explained the origins of Fath al-Islam, the events that led to the violence and what it means for Lebanon and the region.

As usual, the MSM focus on U.S. officials version and omits the others, which by the way are shocking and holds more facts than the "official" story.

Few days ago, Democracy Now! interviewed Seymour Hersh and revealed part of the untold story:

Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh joins us to talk about another theory of who is backing the militant group - the Lebanese government itself, along with the United States. Last March, Hersh reported the U.S. and Saudi governments are covertly backing militant Sunni groups like Fatah al-Islam as part of an overarching foreign policy against Iran and growing Shia influence.
[...]

AMY GOODMAN: Can you explain what you learned?

SEYMOUR HERSH: Well, very simply -- this is over the winter -- the government made -- I think the article is called "The Redirection." There was a major change of policy by the United States government, essentially, which was that we were going to -- the American government would join with the Brits and other Western allies and with what we call the moderate Sunni governments -- that is, the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt -- and join with them and with Israel to fight the Shia.

One of the major goals for America, of course, was the obsession the Bush White House has with Iran, and the other obsession they have is, of course -- is in fear -- is of Hezbollah, the Party of God, that is so dominant in -- the Shia Party of God that's so dominant in southern Lebanon that once -- and whose leader Hassan Nasrallah wants to play a bigger political role and is doing quite a bit to get there and is in direct confrontation with Siniora.

And so, you have a situation where the Sunni government, pretty much in control now, the American-supported Sunni government headed by Fouad Siniora, who was a deputy or an aide to Rafik Hariri, the slain leader of Lebanon, that government has -- we know, the International Crisis Group reported a couple years ago that the son Saad Hariri, the son of Rafik Hariri, who's now a major player in the parliament of Lebanon, he put up $40,000 bail to free four Sunni fundamentalists, Jihadist-Salafists -- which you will -- who were tied directly to -- you know, this word "al-Qaeda" is sort of ridiculous -- they were tied to jihadist groups. And God knows, al-Qaeda, in terms of Osama bin Laden, doesn't have much to do with what we're talking about. These are independently, more or less, you can call them, fanatical jihadists.

And so, the goal -- part of the goal in Lebanon, part of the way this policy played out, was, with Saudi help, Prince Bandar -- if you remember him -- we remember Prince Bandar, the Saudi prince, as a major player in Iran-Contra and also in the American effort two decades ago -- if you remember, we supported Osama bin Laden and other jihadists in Afghanistan against the Russians, and that didn't work out so well. Well, we run right back to the well again, and we began supporting some of these jihadist groups, and particularly -- in the article, I did name Fatah al-Islam.

The idea was to provide them with some arms and some money and some basic equipment so -- these are small units, a couple hundred people. There were three or four around the country given the same help covertly, the goal being they would be potential enemies of Hezbollah in case of warfare; in case Nasrallah decided to do something physical, get kinetic, in Lebanon, the Sunni Siniora government would have some very tough guys on its side, period. That's the policy.

JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, Sy Hersh, if that is true, then what has led to the current fighting now? If the Lebanese government had been backing the group, why is it now attacking it?

SEYMOUR HERSH: Well, first of all, the Lebanese army is very distinct. Let me begin by saying nobody really knows anything right now. I mean, there's a lot -- one of the things about crises is you learn that you really get to play much later. But based on common sense and what I'm reading, the Lebanese army has maintained an amazing sort of neutrality, which is surprising. The army has not been a pawn of the Siniora government.
[..snip..]

So I think the story that we have is that there was a crime, and they were chasing people into one of the Palestinian camps, which are always hotbeds. God knows the Palestinians are the end of the stick, not only for the West, but also for the Arab world. Nobody pays much attention to them and those places. I've been to Tripoli and been into the camps, and they are seething, as they should be. You know, rational people don't like being mistreated. And in any case, so what you have is, what seems to me, just a series -- the word you could use is "unintended consequences." I don't think anybody in the Siniora government anticipated that the people they were covertly supporting to some degree -- I got an email the other day, and I have not checked this out, from somebody who was in the community, in the intelligence community and still consults with the community, he says, "Why don't we ask more about the American arms that the fighters of Fatah al-Islam have, are brandishing?" I don't know if that's true or not, but I did get that email. And so, that could be true. Both Saudi money and American money, not directly, but indirectly, was fed into these groups.

And what is the laugh riot and the reason I'm actually talking to you guys about this -- I usually don't like to do interviews unless I have a story in The New Yorker -- the reason I'm talking about it is because the American government keeps on putting out this story that Syria is behind the Fatah group, which is just beyond belief. There's no way -- it may be possible, but the chances of it are very slight, simply because Syria is a very big supporter, obviously, of Nasrallah, and Bashar al-Assad has told me that he's in awe of Nasrallah, that he worships at his feet and has great respect for him. The idea that the Syrians would be sponsoring Sunni jihadist groups whose sole mission are to kill the apostates -- that is, anybody who doesn't support their view, the Wahhabi or Salafist view of Sunni religion -- that includes the Shia -- anybody who doesn't believe -- support these guys' religions are apostates and are killable, that's basically one of the crazy aspects of all this, and it's just inconceivable. Nothing can be ruled out, but that doesn't make much case, and I noticed that in the papers today there's fewer and fewer references to this. The newspapers in America are beginning to wise up, that this can't be -- this isn't very logical. The White House is putting it out hot and heavy as part of the anti-Syria campaign, but it's not flying, because it doesn't make sense. So there we are. It's another mess.

You might think that one of the reasons -- I think I wrote about this in The New Yorker -- one of the things that the Saudi Bandar had promised us was that we can control the jihadists. We can control them, he assured us. Don't worry about getting in bed with these bad guys, because, as we remember, the same kind of assurances were given to us in the late 1980s, when we supported, as I said, bin Laden and others in the war against Russia, the Mujahideen war, and that, of course, bit us on the ass. And this is, too. So there we are.
[..snip..]

Surprise?!

Well, not until you hear more details. These details answers the question which Hersh could not or didn't have enough info about (Why and what is this all about?).

CounterPunch published an article titled: Who's Behind the Fighting in North Lebanon? - By Dr. Franklin Lamb, in which he gives amazing details and analysis. This is a must read to understand what is going on and why:

Given Bush administration debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan and its encouragement for Israel to continue its destruction of Lebanon this past summer, the situation in Lebanon mirrors, in some respects, the early 1980's when groups sprung up to resist the US green lighted Israeli invasion and occupation. But rather than being Shia and pro-Hezbollah, today's groups are largely Sunni and anti-Hezbollah. Hence they qualify for US aid, funneled by Sunni financial backers in league with the Bush administration which is committed to funding Islamist Sunni groups to weaken Hezbollah.

This project has become the White House obsession following Israel's July 2006 defeat.

To understand what is going on with Fatah al-Islam at Nahr el-Bared one would want a brief introduction to Lebanon's amazing, but shadowy 'Welch Club'.

The Club is named for its godfather, David Welch, assistant to Secretary of State Rice who is the point man for the Bush administration and is guided by Eliot Abrams. Key Lebanese members of the Welch Club (aka: the 'Club') include:

• The Lebanese civil war veteran, warlord, feudalist and mercurial Walid Jumblatt of the Druze party( the Progressive Socialist Party or PSP)
• Another civil war veteran, warlord, terrorist (Served 11 years in prison for massacres committed against fellow Christians among others) Samir Geagea. Leader of the extremist Phalange party and its Lebanese Forces (LF) the group that conducted the Israel organized massacre at Sabra-Shatilla (although led by Elie Hobeika, once Geagea's mentor, Geagea did not take part in the Sept. 1982 slaughter of 1,700 Palestinian and Lebanese).
• The billionaire, Saudi Sheikh and Club president Saad Hariri leader of the Sunni Future Movement (FM).

Over a year ago Hariri's Future Movement started setting up Sunni Islamist terrorist cells (the PSP and LF already had their own militia since the civil war and despite the Taif Accords requiring militia to disarm they are now rearmed and itching for action and trying hard to provoke Hezbollah).

The FM created Sunni Islamist 'terrorist' cells were to serve as a cover for (anti-Hezbollah) Welch Club projects. The plan was that actions of these cells, of which Fatah el-Islam is one, could be blamed on al Qaeda or Syria or anyone but the Club.

To staff the new militias, FM rounded up remnants of previous extremists in the Palestinian Refugee camps that had been subdued, marginalized and diminished during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Each fighter got $700 per month, not bad in today's Lebanon.

The first Welch Club funded militia, set up by FM, is known locally as Jund-al-Sham (Soldiers of Sham, where "Sham" in Arabic denotes Syria, Lebanon, Palestine & Jordan) created in Ain-el-Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon. This group is also referred to in the Camps as Jund-el-Sitt (Soldiers of the Sitt, where "Sitt" in Sidon, Ain-el-Hilwa and the outskirts pertain to Bahia Hariri, the sister of Rafiq Hariri, aunt of Saad, and Member of Parliament).

The second was Fateh-al-Islam (The name cleverly put together, joining Fateh as in Palestinian and the word Islam as in Qaeda). FM set this Club cell up in Nahr-al-Bared refugee camp north of Tripoli for geographical balance.

Fatah el-Islam had about 400 well paid fighters until three days ago. Today they may have more or fewer plus volunteers. The leaders were provided with ocean view luxury apartments in Tripoli where they stored arms and chilled when not in Nahr-al-Bared. Guess who owns the apartments?

According to members of both Fatah el-Islam and Jund-al-Sham their groups acted on the directive of the Club president, Saad Hariri.

So what went wrong? "Why the bank robbery" and the slaughter at Nahr el-Baled?

According to operatives of Fatah el-Islam, the Bush administration got cold feet with people like Seymour Hirsh snooping around and with the White House post-Iraq discipline in free fall. Moreover, Hezbollah intelligence knew all about the Clubs activities and was in a position to flip the two groups who were supposed to ignite a Sunni ­Shia civil war which Hezbollah vows to prevent.

Things started to go very wrong quickly for the Club last week. FM "stopped" the payroll of Fateh el-Islam's account at the Hariri family owned back.

Fateh-al-Islam, tried to negotiate at least 'severance pay' with no luck and they felt betrayed. (Remember many of their fighters are easily frustrated teenagers and their pay supports their families). Militia members knocked off the bank which issued their worthless checks. They were doubly angry when they learned FM is claiming in the media a loss much greater than they actually snatched and that the Club is going to stiff the insurance company and actually make a huge profit.

Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (newly recruited to serve the bidding of the Club and the Future Movement) assaulted the apartments of Fatah-al-Islam Tripoli. They didn't have much luck and were forced to call in the Lebanese army.

Within the hour, Fatah-al-Islam retaliated against Lebanese Army posts, checkpoints and unarmed, off-duty Lebanese soldiers in civilian clothing and committed outrageous killings including severing at four heads.

Up to this point Fatah-al-Islam did not retaliate against the Internal Security forces in Tripoli because the ISF is pro-Hariri and some are friends and Fatah al-Islam still hoped to get paid by Hariri. Instead Fatah al Islam went after the Army.

The Seniora cabinet convenes and asks the Lebanese Army to enter the refugee camp and silence (in more ways than one) Fatah-al-Islam. Since entrance into the Camps is forbidden by the 1969 Arab league agreement, the Army refuses after realizing the extent of the conspiracy against it by the Welch Club. The army knows that entering a refugee camp in force will open a front against the Army in all twelve Palestinian refugee camps and tear the army apart along sectarian cracks.

The army feels set up by the Club's Internal Security Forces which did not coordinate with the Lebanese Army, as required by Lebanese law and did not even make them aware of the "inter family operation" the ISF carried out against Fatah-al-Islam safe houses in Tripoli.

Today, tensions are high between the Lebanese army and the Welch Club. Some mention the phrase 'army coup'.

The Club is trying to run Parliament and is prepared to go all the way not to 'lose' Lebanon. It still holds 70 seats in the house of parliament while the Hezbollah led opposition holds 58 seats. It has a dutiful PM in Fouad Siniora.

The club tried to seize control of the presidency and when it failed it marginalized it. Last year it tried to control of the Parliamentary Constitutional Committee, which audits the government's policies, laws and watch dogs their actions. When the Club failed to control it they simply abolished the Constitutional Committee. This key committee no longer exists in Lebanon's government.

The Welch Club's major error was when it attempted to influence the Lebanese Army into disarming the Lebanese Resistance led by Hezbollah. When the Army wisely refused, the Club coordinated with the Bush Administration to pressure Israel to dramatically intensify its retaliation to the capture of the two soldiers by Hezbollah and 'break the rules' regarding the historically more limited response and try to destroy Hezbollah during the July 2006 war.

The Welch Club now considers the Lebanese Army a serious problem. The Bush administration is trying to undermine and marginalize it to eliminate one of the last two obstacles to implementing Israel's agenda in Lebanon.

If the army is weakened, it can not protect over 70% of the Christians in Lebanon who support General Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. The F.P.M. is mainly constituted of well educated, middle class and unarmed Lebanese civilians. The only protection they have is the Lebanese Army which aids in maintaining their presence in the political scene. The other type of Christians in Lebanon is the minority, about 15% of Christians associated with Geagea's Lebanese Forces who are purely militia. If the Club can weaken the Army even more than it is, then this Phalange minority will be the only relatively strong force on the Christian scene and become the "army" of the Club.

Another reason the Club wants to weaken the Lebanese Army is that the Army is nationalistic and is a safety valve for Lebanon to ensure the Palestinian right of return to Palestine, Lebanese nationhood and the resistance culture led by Hezbollah, with which is has excellent relations.

For their part, the Welch Club wants to keep some Palestinians in Lebanon for cheap labor, ship others to countries willing to take them (and be paid handsomely to do so by American taxpayers) and allow at most a few thousand to return to Palestine to settle the 'right of return' issue while at the same time signing a May 17th 1983 type treaty with Israel with enriches the Club members and gives Israel Lebanon's water and much of Lebanon's sovereignty.

Long story short, Fatah el-Islam must be silenced at all costs. Their tale, if told, is poison for the Club and its sponsors. We will likely see their attempted destruction in the coming days.

Hezbollah is watching and supporting the Lebanese army.

Personally -- as s Sunni Muslim -- I trust Nasrallah and the above version of the story than the official Lebanese/American theory (no theory actually).

Beneath these ironic "unintended consequences" as Hesrh called them, the Palestinian refugees and Lebanese civilians are the victims. For several days now, some PLO figures are negotiating with Fath Al-Islam, on behalf of the Lebanese government, the Lebanese army, the Americans, etc, God knows on whose behalf and for what, but that's not the issue. What is more important to me is the civilian Palestinian refugees who fled the camp, and the remaining ten thousand refugees still in the camp (reports says that more than thirty thousand fled and ten thousand remained).

Once again, Palestinians has nothing to do with the conflict, yet, they pay the price with their blood. In an interview on Al-Arabiya television on May 23, the Lebanese defense minister, Ilyas Murr, stated that of the several dozen terrorist killed in the battles, not a single a fighter is identified as Palestinian. He said they are mostly Lebanese, Saudi, Yemeni, Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan and so on.

I hate to say this, but what the PLO in Lebanon fears is a retaliation war between Palestinians - from one side - and Lebanese - from the other side. Unfortunately this is supported by the fact that, on one hand the Palestinians (not the Lebanese government or the army) are the ones negotiating with Fath al-Islam to save lives and solve the conflict, and on the other hand the dead silence reaction to the indiscriminate killing/shelling of the refugees in the camp by the Lebanese army. No one can imagine that 'some or all' the of the Palestinian militias in Lebanon will keep silent any longer if the Palestinian refugees are not safe and continues to be killed indiscriminately (by the Lebanese army or fath al-Islam) while no one cares to protect them.

Monitoring the reaction in Lebanon this is one of the most painful elements in this story and in history. There is an overwhelming competition by people and organizations to pay tribute to the Lebanese army but not a single political party in Lebanon has spoken out against the indiscriminate shelling of the refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, except for Nasrallah (so Hezbollah), conservatively, indirectly, but late. However, as they say: "better later than never". Contrary, several Lebanese political parties tried and still working on theories to tie Fath al-Islam with Palestinian militias'.

This is nothing but a general racist attitude towards Palestinians. Maybe that's why it is easy for so many people to tolerate indiscriminate attacks on Palestinian refugee camps (similar to Israel case, which always escape the same crimes when they target the Palestinian civilians in Occupied Palestine). If Arab can do it, why not Zionists? Very painful ... but true!

What can YOU do? YOU can help by engaging in Political/media activism AND also donate.

Razan, a sweet close friend of mine informed me few days ago about the formation of Nahr el Bared Relief Campaign. The organization delivers medicine and the supplies needed to Badawi camp (where most refugees of Nahr el Bared camp fled to):

About the Campaign
The Nahr el Bared Relief Campaign was spontaneously formed following the tragic events in Nahr el Bared Camp. We are a grouping of unaffiliated individuals working on relief and civil action to end the violence and offer aid to those injured and displaced due to the Nahr el Bared conflict.

Donation Account Details
For tax-deductible donations to the Nahr el Bared Relief Campaign please use the following account:

AUB Office of Development
https://rtf.aub.edu.lb/

Please make sure to specify that your donation is going to the Nahr el Bared refugees.

Contact us
marcynewman [at] gmail [dot] com: 70-977812 r.moumneh [at] gmail [dot] com: 03-356644

Aid supply drop-offs
If you have any donations you would like to drop off in person, you can do so in Teh-Marboota Cafe, Pavillion Center, Hamra main road.

Razan went to Badawi camp and she made interviews with refugees who've lost their families under the Lebanese army bombs. She got an initial list of martyrs. You can see the post here:
http://ya-ashrafe-nnas.blogspot.com/2007/05/dont-feel-sorry-about-me-see-me.html

More donations can be sent to The Middle East Children's Alliance (MECA):
https://secure.groundspring.org/dn/index.php?aid=1171

(Image by Ben Heine)

Update (1): In his most recent report, the 'Welch club' story writer, Franklin Lamb says, "Will try to send results shortly of my interviews with 11 Fatah al-Islam fighters regarding who paid them and got them travel documents and weapons and what was their mission. There was no bank robbery by them. That was a fake story put out by the Welch Club. Sorry I misreported it. BBC was suckered. Also, no, repeat no heads cut off. Where are the medical reports from those who claim it? That was black propaganda to smear Fatah el-Islam. Must leave this building now may not be until tomorrow or so."

A Dutch reporter in Beirut, Sietske Galama, asks "Who is Franklin Lamb?," and says, "if he's for real, he's real good." Galama notes, "The man is right now inside the Palestinian camp Nahr el-Bared. While all of us journalists are sort of hovering on the outskirts of the camp, this man actually went inside. Or at least that is what he writes."

From the little that I could find out, Dr. Franklin Lamb is described as an "international lawyer," is or was a researcher at the Center for Arab and Middle East Studies, American University of Beirut, a research associate at If Americans Knew, has been in Lebanon researching a book for the past nine months, and is the author of several books about the middle east conflict.

For more analysis and view of this story, see Missing Links' blog posts titled: A possible explanation and The war scenario.

Update (2): In this most recent piece, Franklin Lamb expounds further upon the proposed US airbase, previously broached, as the rationale for the recent terrible covert operations that saw dozens of Palestinians and Lebanese Army soldiers die. He doesn't much distinguish between the proposal as a US or an Israeli airbase (it is marketed as as a US/ NATO initiative) assuming that the hand of David Welch and Elliot Abrams means that the ziocons in the US might as well mean that Israel would have access to a proposed base in a country they were just at war with. (Source: Ann)